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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD WOLFE , 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970422-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURI; OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of Assault a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in 
violation of UCA §76-5-102 after a bench trial on February 24, 1997, empaneled by Honorable, 
Roger Bean. 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred upon this court pursuant to 
UCA §78-2a-3(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
The court erred in convicting the defendant based upon the repudiated hearsay statement 
of Patricia Kling when there was no evidence or corroboration. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the Court rulings are based upon Conclusion of Law, we review the decision for 
correctness. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P. 2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The appellant properly moved to arrest the judgement of the court and a hearing was held 
on said motion on May 19, 1997, before the Honorable Judge Roger Bean. (Transcript p. 134-
157) 
POINT II 
The court erred in considering the pre Miranda silence as evidence against the defendant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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Admission of evidence is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. However, 
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations should be given deference by the appellate 
court and only be overruled when they are clearly erroneous. State V. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694 (Ct. 
App. 1993); State v. Tavlor. 818 P 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1991). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The defendant objected at the hearing on motion to arrest the judgement to the court 
considering the defendant's silence as evidence (Trans. P. 136-137 lines 10-25 and lines 1-5) and 
the court found that said evidence was admissible (Trans P. 156-157 lines 17-25 and lines 1-3) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION STATUTES AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment V— No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation. 
Amendment XIV— Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I — Section 12. In Criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgement, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
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that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed after the defendant was found 
guilty of Assault, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in violation of UCA §76-5-102. Pursuant to 
written memorandum dated April 10, 1997. 
Mr. Wolfe appeals his conviction and sentence based upon the following: 
1. The court committed reversible err when it failed to grant defendant motion to arrest 
judgement when the conviction was based upon the refuted hearsay statement of Patricia 
Kling. 
2. The court committed reversible err when it considered the defendant's post arrest pre 
Miranda silence as evidence to corroborate the victims hearsay statement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The purported victim testified that she gave a written statement to the police which was 
in writing and the city moved for it's admission (trans. P. 39 lines 19-25 and P. 40 lines 1-13) 
and it was admitted (Trans P. 63 lines 13-25 and P. 64 lines 1-13). The defendant then testified 
that she was the initial aggressor including kicking the defendant in the groin (Trans. P.46 lines 
23-25 and P. 47 lines 1-23). Patricia Kling then further testified that she attempted to tell the 
officers at the time that she was the aggressor. She also testified that she stated this same to the 
City Attorney at a later date (Trans. P. 108 lines 16-25 and P. 109 1-18). Further she testified 
that the statement in exhibit one was not entirely true (Trans P. 41 lines 13-23 also see Trans P. 
86 lines 19-25). 
Thomas Hill testified that he was one of the officers responding to a 911 call. He testified 
that the defendant did not complain of any physical injuries or make any statement concerning 
this matter (Trans P. 74 Line 17-21 Trans P. 75 Lines 23-25 and P. 76 1-3). Mr. Hill further 
testified that the defendant was never given his Miranda rights or had any conversation with him 
(Trans. 76 Lines 8-17). 
The defendant testified that Patricia Kling had slapped him twice and kick him in the 
groin and he slapped her when she tried to hit and kick him again (Trans 103 lines 13-21) He 
further testified that he had told the officers that she had struck him (Trans P. 104 lines 5-20) 
ARGUMENT 
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POINT I 
The court committed reversible err when it failed to grant defendant motion to arrest 
judgement when the conviction was based upon the refuted hearsay statement of Patricia Kling. 
The appellant raised the issue of self-defense, both through the testimony of Patricia 
Kling and himself, during the trial and therefore the city has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self defense. See State v. Knoll 712 P.2nd 211 
(Utah 1985). The conviction in this case is based upon the refuted statement of Patricia Kling 
wherein she did not tell the officers that she was the initial aggressor and the court based it's 
decision in this case on the fact that it did not find her testimony at trial credible. 
"The issue, therefore, is whether a person can be convicted of a crime solely on the basis 
of an unsworn, uncross-examined, out-of-court statement. The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that the issue of whether a hearsay statement is sufficient by itself to support a conviction 
is " not insubstantial." California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149, 170 n.19 (1970). A conviction not 
based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand. It is a "Violation of due process to convict 
and punish a man without evidence of his guilt. Thompson v. City of Louisville. 362 U.S. 199, 
206 (1960). Much of the evidence under Count I is at best highly unreliable, and none is 
probative of the charge actually made by the prosecution, except to a very extenuated degree. 
Under Utah law, both currently and under previous rules, the out-of-court statement 
attributed to the boy is deemed substantive evidence. Nevertheless, not all substantive evidence 
is of equal probative value. During the Senate hearings on the adoption of Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the objection was raised that Federal Rule 801 (d) (1) (A), which admits prior 
inconsistent hearsay statements as substantive evidence, would permit the government to sustain 
a conviction entirely on prior inconsistent hearsay statement. The Senate committee report 
states: 
It would appear that some of the opposition to this Rule is based on a concern that a 
person could be convicted solely upon evidence admissible under this Rule. The Rule, however, 
is not addressed to the question of the sufficiency of evidence to send a case to the jury, but 
merely as to its admissibility. Factual circumstances could well arise where, if this were the sole 
evidence, dismissal would be appropriate. 
S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cod Cong. & Admins, 
news 7051 n.21. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) (A) acts more broadly to admit out-of-court statements 
or substantive evidence than its federal counterpart because the Utah rule does not require that 
out-of-court statement which is denied at trial by the declarant is insufficient by itself to sustain 
a conviction. 
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On facts similar to the instant case, the Sixth Circuit Court reversed a conviction based 
on hearsay declaration on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. United States v. Orrico 
599 F. 2d 113 (6th Cir. 1979). The court held: 
[W]hen [out-of-court statements are ] the only source of support for the central 
allegations of the charge, especially when the statements barely, if at all, meet the minimal 
requirements of admissibility, we do not believe that a substantial factual basis as to each 
element of the crime providing support for a conclusion of guilty beyond reasonable doubt has 
been offered by the Government. 
IcL At 1181 Other cases have also held that uncorroborated, unsworn hearsay statements 
alone are insufficient evidence to convict when later repudiated at trial. See Brower v. State, 
728 P. 2d 645, 647-48 (Alaska Ct. Appl 1986); State v. Moore, 485 so. 2d 1279, 1281 (Fla. 
1986); State v. Allien, 366 so. 2d 1308, 1311 (La. 1978); State v. White Water, 634 P. 2d 636, 
639 (Mont 1981) ; Chamber v. State, 755 S.W. 2d 907, 910 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), review 
granted, No. 01-86-00520-CR (April 26, 1989); Fernandez v. State, 755 S.W. 2d 220, 222 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988), review granted, No. 01-87-11-5 Cr. (May 1989) 
These cases are consistent with Utah law which holds that uncorroborated evidence is 
insufficient, by itself, to support a verdict in a civil case. See Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984); Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 p. 
2D 481, 486 (Utah 1981); Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 315, 358 P. 2d 
312, 315, 358 P.2d 899, 901 (1961); Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 
500, 132 P. 2nd 376, 380 (1942). Recently, in State v. Webb, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (July 21, 
1989), this court held that a single uncorroborated hearsay statement was not substantial 
evidence and not sufficient to support the verdict. Id. At 29 (Separate opinion of Stewart, j> , 
joined by Hall, C.J. Howe, Assoc. C.J., and Durham., J.). 
In sum, a conviction that is based entirely on a single, uncorroborated hearsay out-of-
court statement that is denied by the declarant in court under oath cannot stand. We therefore 
hold that the single out-of-court statement attributed to the boy by Harrison was insufficient to 
support defendant's conviction under count I. 
POINT II 
The court erred in considering the defendant's post arrest pre-Miranda silence as 
evidence. 
In the case of State v. Palmer 860 P 2nd 339 (Ut. App 1993) the court held that a 
defendant's post-arrest pre-Miranda silence, and his pre-arrest pre-Miranda silence is 
inadmissible in the Prosecution's Case in Chief and can only be used for impeachment purposes 
if the defendant does testify. In this case the prosecution never attempted to impeach Mr. Wolfe 
with his pre-Miranda silence. (Trans. P. 105-107 line 1) 
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FILED 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
MAY - 5 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
The trial Court erred when it considered the refuted prior statement of the alleged victim 
Patricia Kling, in reaching its decision of guilt of the def when there was not sufficient 
corroboration of the prior statement. The court was informed at the time of the motion to arrest 
judgement that a conviction based upon a refuted prior statement is not sufficient to base a 
conviction unless that statement has other corroboration. If the court had required the 
corroboration the motion to arrest judgement should have been granted. 
The court erred in considering the appellant's pre and post arrest pre-Miranda silence as 
corroboration of Patricia Kling's refuted statement. A defendant's pre and post arrest silence is 
not admissible as evidence in the state's case in chief, and is only admissible for impeachment of 
the defendant if he testifies. Since the city did not attempt to impeach the defendant by his 
silence it was improper for the court to consider his silence as evidence. 
U RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *_£L Day of May, 1998 
RTIN V. G^^VIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief to the following: 
STEVEN GARSIDE 
LAYTON CITY ATTORNEY 
437 N. Wasatch Dr. 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Dated this _7_ of May, 1998. 
^ClARtiN V. GRAVIS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
In this case there is clearly a conflict, between Mr. Wolfe's testimony and that of the 
officers, as to weather or not he made a statement to the officers. The court found that he did not 
make a statement to the officers. His pre-Miranda silence, therefor, cannot be used as 
corroborating evidence with that of Patricia Klings refuted hearsay statement. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the argument set forth above the appellants judgement of conviction should 
be reversed and the case should be remanded to the District Court to enter an order granting 
defendant motion to arrest judgement. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J _ Day of May, 1998 
^ M A RTIN V. GRAVIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief to the following: 
STEVEN GARSIDE 
LAYTON CITY ATTORNEY 
437 N. Wasatch Dr. 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Dated this _/_ of May, 1998. 
MARTIN V. GRAVIS 7 ^ 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
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Addendum "A" 
Transcripts on Hearing and 
Memorandum of Decision 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
LAYTON CITY, a Municipal Corporation. 
Plaintiff, Case No. 961000249 
v. Date 4-10-97 
RICHARD D. WOLFE. 
Defendant Judge Bean 
MATTER: ASSAULT CHARGE, TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 
Through testimony from Ms. Kling, Dr. Holley and Officer Hill, the city established 
that the defendant assaulted Patricia Kling on or about January 27, 1996. 
The city prosecutor granted use immunity to Ms. Kling and had authority to do so 
pursuant to the provisions of § 10-3-928, Utah Code Annotated. 
The defendant introduced evidence of justification, or self defense. The city then 
had the burden to prove the absence of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985). The city attempted to do so by 
producing testimony of discrepancies between Patricia Kiing's statements of what 
happened given at the time of the incident, and her testimony given at trial. The 
Court finds the city's evidence to be persuasive. The Court does not believe either 
Ms. Kiing's in-court testimony in support of justification or the defendant's 
testimony on the same point. They were not believable because: 
Ms. Kling had convenient lapses of memory on any facts that were 
inconsistent wi th her in-court testimony on who began the physical assaults, 
Ms. Kling and the defendant had reconciled and were back living together. 
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Although Ms. Kling minimized the injuries she received from the defendant, Dr. 
Holley's testimony was that, when seen at the emergency room, Ms. Kling 
was upset, tearful and very disturbed, had swelling at the bridge of her nose, 
had red marks on her neck, was still bleeding from the nose, and had 
extremely high blood pressure due to emotional stress. The doctor testified 
that Ms. Kling never indicated that she had initiated the use of physical force. 
On the contrary, she told the doctor that her boyfriend had hit her in the nose 
with a closed fist. 
On Officer Hill's second trip to the home, Ms. Kling answered the door crying 
and bleeding from the nose. She was very upset and stated her boyfriend had 
hit her in the face. The officer found the defendant outside, hiding in a bush 
near the side of the house. He told Officer Hill he had hit Ms. Kling. He said 
nothing about her having hit him first, and showed no sign of injury. He 
walked on his own power, he mentioned no pain, and he never claimed he had 
acted in self defense. 
The writ ten statement Ms. Kling gave the officers stated that the defendant, 
having been drinking heavily, shoved her around and pushed her down on the 
bed. She retaliated by slapping him and telling him he had to leave in the 
morning. He then hit her in the nose with his fist. After he tried to make up 
to her and got rebuffed, he put his finger between her eyes and said he would 
kill her. Although she acknowledged she'd slapped him, she said nothing 
about any kick to his groin. 
The Court concludes that the city met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not act in self defense. 
The Court adjudges the defendant guilty and enters a conviction. The Court sets 
the defendant's sentencing on Monday, May 19, 1997, at 10:30 a.m. and orders 
him to be present. Additionally, the Court orders him to contact, without delay, the 
Davis County office of Adult Probation and Parole, by phone at the number circled 
on the paper included herewith, and arrange to be interviewed in the Davis County 
office of AP/P. This must be done as soon as possible. They will then have 
enough time to prepare a presentence report by the above sentencing date. If the 
sentencing date is inconvenient for Defendant or counsel, it can be reset by a call 
to the clerk. 
Judge 
1 witness testifies as ordered by the Court or as 
2 volunteered under the grant of immunity. But 
3 transactional immunity would prevent any 
4 prosecution even from independent evidence rather 
5 than from what the witness testifies in court and 
6 it would be broader. And I don't know that for 
7 purposes of what we're dealing with here it makes a 
8 lot of difference. Maybe the City would grant 
9 transactional immunity. But the offer .on the 
10 record is use immunity and so we'll deal with that 
11 as we proceed. 
12 The Court denies the defendant's, defense 
13 counsel or the witness's counsel's request, or I 
14 should say overrules the objection to the question 
15 about whether that's her handwriting. Directs 
16 the, the witness to answer the question whether or 
17 not the statement that Counsel showed you is your 
18 writing, ma'am. 
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. 
20 MR. GARSIDE: And for the Court's 
21 information we've now marked that as PLAINTIFF'S 
22 EXHIBIT #1. 
23 And Ms. Kling, is that, is that your 
24 signature at the bottom of that page? 
25 MR. GALE: Same objection, Your Honor. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
PAGE 3 9 
1 THE JUDGE: All right. And the Court 
2 overrules that objection and directs the witness to 
3 answer. 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. 
5 MR. GARSIDE: And from the time that you 
* 6 wrote that, well, since the time that you wrote 
7 that on that paper have there been any amendments, 
8 additions, deletions, any changes that, that you 
9 can recognize in that document? 
10 A. (THE WITNESS:) Not to my knowledge, no. 
11 Q. (MR. GARSIDE:) Your Honor, at this time 
12 I'd move for the admission of PLAINTIFF'S 
13 EXHIBIT #1. 
14 THE JUDGE: Thank you. Mr. Gravis? 
15 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I would ask the 
16 Court reserve decision until I've had an 
17 opportunity to cross examine. 
18 THE JUDGE: All right. The Court will 
19 reserve decision on that. 
20 MR. GARSIDE: No further questions of 
21 this witness at this time, Your Honor. 
22 THE JUDGE: Thank you. Mr. Gravis? 
23 CROSS BY MR. GRAVIS FOR DEFENSE 
24 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MICROPHONE) 
25 MR. GRAVIS: Okay. Ms. Kling, drawing 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
PAGE 4 0 
1 your attention back to January 26th of last year, 
2 you said you went to the hospital and there were a 
3 lot of people around? 
4 A. (THE WITNESS:) That's true. 
5 Q. And you gave this written statement. 
6 Correct? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q. Now who were the people that were talking 
9 to you again? 
10 A. Oh, there were women, some women from a 
11 women's group and the doctor and the police 
12 officers and, and all my children were there and--
13 Q. Now what's been marked PLAINTIFF'S 
14 EXHIBIT #1, is this a true statement of what 
15 happened on the 26th of January of last year? 
16 A. It's not entirely true. It's not 
17 complete. 
18 Q. Did you tell the officers about more 
19 things that occurred? 
20 A. I really didn't want to talk to them. I 
21 really tried to--
22 Q. Okay. Just answer my question. 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Did you tell the officers other things 
25 that occurred? 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
PAGE 4 1 
1 MR. GALE: Your Honor, I've seen, I've 
2 seen this charged and it has been charged by the 
3 Weber County Attorney's Office. I can give the 
4 Court the name, State versus William Pledger who 
5 was charged with aggravated assault for the use of 
6 a steel-toed cowboy boot. 
7 THE JUDGE: Did that go up on appeal? 
8 MR. GALE: I don't recall, Your Honor. 
9 THE JUDGE: You know what--
10 MR. GALE: I know it went, I know it 
11 went to trial and that he was, in my recollection, 
12 convicted by a jury. And I don't recall the appeal 
13 status of that case. 
14 THE JUDGE: All right. I don't, I have 
15 some question about whether or not that would be an 
16 aggravated assault and so I overrule the objection 
17 and order the witness to answer that question, for 
18 whatever, with whatever consequences it may have 
19 for use or transactional immunity. 
20 Do you, do you recall the question, 
21 ma'am? 
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
23 MR. GRAVIS: You recall the question or 
24 yes you did kick him in the groin? 
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
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MR. GRAVIS: And that was the first blow 
that was struck? 
MR. GALE: Your Honor, I assume the 
Court has a continuing order to answer these 
questions. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. This line of 
questioning I'm going to allow Mr. Gravis to cross 
examine. 
THE WITNESS: I slapped him first and 
then that happened. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. You slapped him 
first. And that was, the slap was the first blow 
struck. So any blows he struck was after you had 
hit him first. Correct? How many times did--
MR. GALE: You have to answer out 
loud. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. 
MR. GRAVIS: How many times did he hit 
you? 
THE WITNESS 
MR. GRAVIS: 
him in the groin? 
THE WITNESS 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE JUDGE: 
Once . 
That was after you'd kicked 
Yes . 
Nothing further. 
Thank you. Further 
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THE WITNESS 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE JUDGE: 
Yes . 
I have no objection 
He may, he may be 
The City calls 
excused. Thank you, Doctor. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. GARSIDE: Thank you. 
Tom Hill. 
WHEREUPON, 
THOMAS N. HILL 
having been placed under oath by the clerk of the 
court and sworn to testify truthfully in this 
matter, upon examination testified as follows: 
MR. GRAVIS: Well, Your Honor, just since 
you denied my motion to strike I have no objection, 
preserving my appeal issue on that, that State's 
proposed EXHIBIT #1 be admitted which is the 
statement. 
THE JUDGE: Well your, I assume your 
continuing objection under Rule 804 would render 
that statement--
MR. GRAVIS: Well, Your Honor, she's, 
she's testified so I submit that the testimony, 
that based upon your order that she, and the 
immunity, she's testified. So then the City is 
not relying on 804 at this point. 
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1 THE JUDGE: Well, because we're here 
2 ready to go. The Court took under advisement your 
3 804 objection but thought we'd better hear it, you 
4 know, and then if I determine that you have a valid 
5 objection why we-- I, I forget all that and a--
* 6 MR, GRAVIS: Well, Your Honor, what I'm 
7 saying is that since the witness has testified 
8 pursuant to your order that you required her to 
9 answer the questions, then the 804 does .not apply 
10 because she's testified and the 804 only applies if 
11 the witness is (short inaudible, no mic). 
12 THE JUDGE: Oh, I see what you're 
13 saying. You're talking about--
14 MR. GRAVIS: So since she's already 
15 testified she's not unavailable and, therefore--
16 THE JUDGE: All right. 
17 MR. GRAVIS: -- 804 doesn't, we don't 
18 have to worry about it anymore. 
19 THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
20 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. GARSIDE FOR PLAINTIFF 
21 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MIC) 
22 MR. GARSIDE: Your full name please? 
23 A. Thomas Nathan Hill. 
24 Q. And your employment? 
25 A. Director of human resources for a 
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what did you do? 
A. Placed him in my patrol vehicle to make 
transport to the Davis County Jail. 
Q. How long of a walk is it from where you 
placed him under arrest to your, where you had 
your patrol car? 
A. Not exact but 60 yards, 50 yards. 
Q. And did he walk on his own power? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Was he handcuffed? 
A. Yes, he was. 
Q. Behind his back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you and Officer Lowry were escorting 
him? 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right. And, and during that, during 
that walk did, was there any, any complaint by the 
defendant as to any, any physical injuries, any 
discomfort ? 
A. There was no complaint made. 
Q. Do you recall any conversation at all 
during that, during that walk? 
A. Nothing specific. It was some time ago. 
I do believe he made mention that he was, had some 
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1 military involvement. I'm not exactly sure. 
2 Q. So just casual conversation? 
3 A. Casual conversation, yes. 
4 Q. Nothing more about the incident? 
5 A. Nothing. Nothing further at that time. 
6 Q. And then you transported him from there in 
7 your patrol car down to the Davis County Jail? 
8 A. Yes, I did. 
9 Q. And was there anybody else in your patrol 
10 car with you? 
11 A. Just myself and Mr. Wolfe. 
12 Q. And how long of a drive was that 
13 approximately timewise? 
14 A. Oh, it's 10 minutes. 
15 Q. And then were you required to remain there 
16 while he was initially booked into that facility? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. And how long was that? 
19 A. I do not recall how long time, the time 
20 frame was there. It was a busy night. But I, I 
21 simply can't recall. 
22 Q. During any time during the transport or 
23 while you were in, in the Davis County facility 
24 waiting for him to be booked, at any time did 
25 Mr. Wolfe state to you that he was in pain or that 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
PAGE 75 
1 he had been assaulted in any way during that 
2 evening? 
3 A. There was no mention made. 
4 Q. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
5 THE JUDGE: Thank you. Mr. Gravis? 
6 CROSS BY MR, GRAVIS FOR DEFENSE 
7 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MIC) 
8 MR. GRAVIS: In fact, after you arrested 
9 him you never even read him his Miranda. Right? 
10 A. I don't believe I did. 
11 Q. And you didn't question him so you didn't 
12 get into a conversation about what happened after 
13 you arrested him? 
14 A. There was no conversation further as far 
15 as--
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. -- as far as that. No, sir. 
18 Q. Now, were you the one that took the 
19 statement from Patricia Kling? 
20 A. No, I am not. 
21 Q. Okay. So when you went in all she told 
22 you is that she'd been struck in the face? 
23 A. Correct. She said she--
24 Q. You didn't, you didn't find out what 
25 precipitated it or anything like that. Correct? 
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1 THE WITNESS: Pardon me? 
2 MR, GARSIDE: And who was it that, that 
3 struck you in the face that caused your nose to 
4 bleed? 
5 A. (THE WITNESS:) Richard. 
6 Q. (MR. GARSIDE:) Was it painful? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Nothing further. 
9 THE JUDGE: Thank you. You may cross. 
10 RECROSS BY MR. GRAVIS FOR DEFENSE 
11 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MIC) V 
12 MR. GRAVIS: This is after you had 
13 slapped him and after he'd kicked you, after you'd 
14 kicked him in the groin? 
15 A. Well, I had kicked him and then he tried 
16 to hold me away. And it was verbal, a lot of 
17 verbal going on. And I tried to kick him again and 
18 that's when he hit me. 
19 Q. Okay. And you said you told that to the 
20 officer who took your statement at the police, at 
21 the hospital. Right? You tried to tell him 
22 about the kicking? 
23 A. I tried to tell everybody it was my 
24 fault. Nobody wanted to listen. 
25 Q. Okay. Nothing further. 
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verbal argument with each other and there was a lot 
of things said, name calling. I believe there was 
a little shoving between the two of us. I was--
Q. Okay. Did, at any time did you leave? 
A. Yes. I, I went outside to get some air 
for a few minutes. And I came back in a few 
minutes later and I really can't tell you how long 
I was outside. Continued arguing. 
You say you went outside. Where did you 
go? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Out in the back yard. 
Okay. 
And we just continued arguing. Again, a 
little shoving, name calling. I was slapped 
twice. I was kicked in the groin once. I, I had 
some marks on my chest where, where she had hit 
me . 
And she went to kick and hit me again and 
I slapped her. 
Q. You slapped her where? 
A. Across her nose, or her nose. 
Q. Okay. And then what happened? 
A. I, I felt bad. I tried to apologize. I 
helped, tried to help her stop the bleeding. She 
was screaming and crying, upset. And I, I just 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
PAGE 10 3 
1 went outside. She didn't, you know, want to be 
2 around me. 
3 Q. Okay. And what happened next? 
4 A. The police came. I was scared and I was 
5 outside of the back of the house. And they asked 
6 me what had happened and I told them that she had 
7 struck me a couple times and I had slapped her. 
8 Q. Okay. When you said you told them she 
9 started it, did you tell, did you tell the officers 
10 where she'd struck you? 
11 A. Yes. I said she had slapped me and kicked 
12 me in the groin a couple times. 
13 Q. Okay. And then what happened? 
14 A. They put handcuffs on me and hauled me 
15 down to Farmington. 
16 Q. Did you talk to the officers any further? 
17 A. There was a little discussion in the back 
18 of the car. And I know that I had told them that 
1 9 II I, they had never-- I'd been hit and I struck 
20 || her 
21 || Q. Okay. Nothing further 
22 II THE JUDGE: Thank you. You may cross 
2 3 II examine . 
24 || MR. GARSIDE: Thank you. Your Honor 
25 
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1 CROSS BY MR. GARSIDE FOR PLAINTIFF 
2 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MIC) 
3 MR. GARSIDE: Mr. Wolfe, you'd been 
4 drinking that evening? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 Q . To excess ? 
7 A. I don't believe it was to excess. I--
8 Q. You don't think that you were drunk? 
9 A. Well, yes. I, I was probably-- I guess 
10 after five or six beers, yes, I was probably 
11 legally drunk. 
12 Q. And wasn't your first, the first argument 
13 that you had with her was about the fact that you 
14 wanted to drive home from where it was that you 
15 were, whatever club that you were at? Wasn't that 
16 your first argument? 
17 A. I really don't recall what the argument 
18 was. If it was about a particular person or--
19 Q. Or whether you wanted to drive and she 
20 didn't want you to drive? 
21 A. I, I cannot answer that. 
22 Q. You don't recall that? 
23 A. No, I don't. 
24 Q. And but the argument started while you 
25 were at the club? 
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1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. And continued when you were at home? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. And a, basically it was a shoving match is 
5 what you were saying? 
^6 A. It was a verbal yelling match. And then 
7 it turned into a little shoving. And then it 
8 turned into getting struck. 
9 Q. Did you drive from the club? 
10 A. That was 13 months ago. I really don't 
11 recall if I drove from that club or not. 
12 Q. But you're not having any problems with 
13 anything else memory-wise other than that. Is that 
14 correct? 
15 A. I, I really don't know on that particular 
16 evening if I did drive or not. We share those 
17 duties. 
18 Q. Did you know that she had called 911? 
19 A. No, I did not. 
20 Q. Do you recall any of the, any of the words 
21 that were used during your arguments? Do you 
22 recall the topics of, of the arguments? 
23 A. I do not. I don't, I don't really-- I 
24 can't tell you for sure what the argument was 
25 about. 
ijj 
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1 II Q . I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
2 || THE JUDGE; Thank you. Further 
3 II direct? 
4 MR. GRAVIS: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
5 THE JUDGE: You may step down, 
6 Mr. Wolfe. Thank you. 
7 MR. GRAVIS: We call Patricia Kling, Your 
8 Honor. 
9 WHEREUPON, 
10 PATRICIA KLING 
11 having been placed previously under oath by the 
12 clerk of the court and sworn to testify truthfully 
13 in this matter, resumed the stand upon examination 
14 testified as follows: 
15 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. GRAVIS FOR DEFENSE 
16 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MIC) 
17 MR. GRAVIS: You understand you're still 
18 under oath? 
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
20 Q. Just to clarify something. The first 
21 \\ time the officers arrived had there beerir what kind 
22 || of physical altercation had, had happened prior to 
23 || that time? 
24 || A. Very verbal and probably some shoving. I 
25 || wouldn't-- But I, I don't really remember to be 
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1 really honest with you. 
2 Q. Okay. But after, so after the officers 
3 had been there the first time, that you kicked the 
4 defendant. Correct? 
5 A. I slapped him first and then,--
6 Q. You slapped him first and then kicked him? 
7 A. -- and then he tried to hold me off and I 
8 kicked him. 
9 Q. And that-- And then when you tried to 
10 kick him again is when he hit you in the face? 
11 Okay. And that--
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. And are you telling the truth 
14 today? 
15 A. Yes, I am. I'm telling the truth. 
16 Q. And did you try to tell the officer who 
17 took your written statement that this is what had 
18 happened? 
19 A. Yes, I did. I even told the prosecuting 
20 II attorney, the woman, the truth when I talked to 
21 il her. 
22 || Q. So are you referring to--
23|| A. Yes , I am. 
24 || Q. -- this lady here? 
25 || A. Yes, I am. I told her. 
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MR. GALE: This one or--
THE WITNESS: Yes 
3 MR. GALE: Susan Hunt. 
4 THE WITNESS: Well, it was the one that 
5 talked to me. I'm not sure. She was 
6 representing, she was the one that talked to me. 
7 I don't know whether it was Susan or her but it was 
8 a woman and I did tell her. 
9 MR. GRAVIS: Okay. When was.that? 
10 A. (THE WITNESS:) I do believe she was 
11 probably blonder. 
12 Q. (MR. GRAVIS:) When was that? 
13 A. When we first come to court and she wanted 
14 to talk to me. And I told her then it was my 
15 fault. 
16 Q. Was that when Mr. Gale was with you or was 
17 that earlier (short inaudible, no mic) ? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. And now when did you first talk to 
20 Mr. Gale about this? 
21 A. Probably the day after it happened I 
22 called him. 
23 Q. Okay. And did you tell him what you've 
24 told the Court today? 
25 A. Yes, I did. 
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1 || P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 II (MAY 1 9 , 1 9 9 6 ) 
3 THE CLERK: Number 17. Lavton City 
4 versus Richard Wolfe. 961000249. Set for 
5 hearing and sentencing. Steve Garside present for 
6 Layton City. Martin Gravis present for the 
7 defendant. 
8 THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
9 Maybe we ought to hear the Motion for, in Arrest of 
10 Judgment before we go to sentencing. I imagine 
11 that's the best procedure to follow, Mr. Gravis. 
12 MR. GRAVIS: I would certainly hope so, 
13 Your Honor. 
14 THE JUDGE: All right. 
15 MR, GRAVIS: If I'm successful in my 
16 motion then we get directly to the next one on the 
17 calendar. 
18 THE JUDGE: All right. The record 
19 should show also that Mr. Wolfe is present with 
20 Counsel. And why don't you go ahead. I have 
21 looked at the memoranda filed by Counsel and I'd 
22 welcome your argument. 
23 MOTION BY MR, GRAVIS FOR DEFENSE 
24 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MICROPHONE) 
25 MR. GRAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. As the 
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1 Court is aware it is our position that the 
2 testimony of Patricia Kling in this case was much 
3 different than the statement that was introduced 
4 into evidence under Rule 801. That in fact she 
5 [I had repudiated the prior statement on the basis 
6 that she testified that neither the police nor the 
7 doctor wanted to hear the whole story, that they 
8 were pressing her to say that Mr. Wolfe had hit 
9 her. They didn't want to hear the part about 
10 where she had hit him and kicked him in the groin 
11 with her steel-toed cowboy boot prior to his 
12 hitting her. 
13 It's our position that when she repudiated 
14 the prior statement, though admissible under 
15 Rule 801 it's, it cannot be the basis for a 
16 conviction without corroboration. That's based 
17 upon the case of, just a minute, I have it right 
18 here. State versus Ramsey which we cite in our 
19 brief. 
20 As the Court had pointed out in the 
memorandum decision, State versus Mowell (?) 
22 || requires that the City prove the absence- of 
23 || self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is 
24 || our position that Patricia Kling testified that she 
25 || was the aggressor, that Mr. Wolfe acted in 
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1 self-defense and she was trying to kick him in the 
2 groin a second time when he slapped her and pushed 
3 her and his actions occurred. That there is no 
4 corroboration that that is not what happened. 
5 That, that her, the State offers that, well the 
6 doctor and the police officer but neither one of 
7 those were eyewitnesses. They could certainly see 
8 that she was injured but they were not there to see 
9 what happened prior to the injuries. 
10 The City also attempts to argue that 
11 Mr. Wolfe did not state this at the time he was 
12 arrested. First off, it is our position that 
13 the, that this Court heard the evidence, entered 
14 findings of the fact which are incorporated in the 
15 Statement of Fact in, in my memorandum. And 
16 therefore, they're attempting to bring in new 
17 evidence or argufe things that the Court has not 
18 found as evidence. 
19 And more importantly it is our position 
20 II that under State versus Palmer, which is a Court 
21 || of Appeals case, 860 P.2nd 339, that the Court of 
22 II Appeals in Utah has held following the federal 
23 || rule, Federal Supreme Court that although while 
24 || his, Mr. Wolfe's pre or post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
25 || silence may be admissible for impeachment purposes 
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1 it's not admissible under the City's case in 
2 chief. And, therefore, to argue that his silence 
3 about what happened corroborates Ms. Kling's prior 
4 statement is improper, that that is not something 
5 that the Court can consider as evidence. 
6 " The Court may recall Mr., Mr. Wolfe was 
7 arrested. Prior to the arrest he admitted that he 
8 struck Ms. Kling and that he was sorry. But he did 
9 not, he was not further questions nor was he given 
10 his Miranda warning. But he did-- That was his 
11 entire statement. 
12 ' Now in the Palmer case, that is somewhat 
13 similar facts. In that case the defendant had 
14 been, was under investigation on a child sexual 
15 abuse case and called the detective and talked to 
16 the detective. And the State at that, in that case 
17 tried to admit that he never, that he never denied 
18 that he committed the act so, therefore, it was a 
19 conscious inference of his guilt. And that's what 
20 the City is trying to argue here is that because he 
21 never denied or never stated that he was acting in 
22 self-defense that therefore he, it's a conscious 
23 indication of his guilt. 
24 We would submit that the Palmer case does 
25 not allow that, the Court to make that inference. 
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1 Although when Mr. Wolfe took the stand that they, 
2 the City certainly had the ability of-- I can't 
3 recall whether they did even ask him about it. But 
4 it's only for impeachment purposes, not for 
5 introduction in the case in chief. 
* 6 THE JUDGE: Can I ask you about that? I 
7 don't remember the Palmer case specifically, 
8 Mr. Gravis, but I would think that if the case, or 
9 the investigation I guess more accurately, had 
10 progressed to the point where a Miranda warning was 
11 required then silence after that point should be 
12 properly excluded if the Miranda warning was not 
13 given. 
14 Now are you saying that that's comparable 
15 to the facts here? That this had progressed to the 
16 point, the investigation here, that Miranda warning 
17 should have been given before Mr. Wolfe's statement 
18 to the officers? 
19 MR. GRAVIS: No, I'm not, Your Honor. 
2 0 THE JUDGE: Okay. 
21 MR, GRAVIS: Palmer was a telephone 
22 call. The defendant, the investigative detective 
23 left a card with, at the defendant's residence 
24 being unable to contact him. And the defendant in 
25 the Palmer case, Mr. Palmer had called the 
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1 detective on the telephone and the conversation 
2 that was admitted into evidence was a telephone 
3 conversation. The defendant was not in custody, 
4 he had not been charged at that point. He wasn't 
5 even-- He was, he was talking on the telephone. 
6 And the Court of Appeals says that 
7 pre-Miranda silence is not admissible in a case in 
8 chief. And the Utah, United States Supreme Court 
9 has held that too. Post, clearly post-Miranda 
.0 silence, exercising the right is never admissible 
11 but even pre-Miranda silence is admissible only 
12 for impeachment purposes. Now that, in the Palmer 
13 case--
14 THE JUDGE: This is not cited in your 
15 brief. Or is it? 
16 MR. GRAVIS: No. It's not cited in my 
17 brief. This is in response to the State's, the 
18 City's argument. 
1 9 II THE JUDGE: The one time I need my laptop 
20 || at the bench to look up a case and I haven't 
21 || brought it . 
22 || MR. GRAVIS: I do have a copy but I'm 
23 || sorry, I should have had them make copies for you 
24 II and Mr. Garside 
25 THE JUDGE All right 
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1 MR. GRAVIS: But just to let you know, in 
2 Palmer they cite the case of Jenkins versus 
3 Anderson, United States Supreme Court case where 
4 the United States Supreme Court held that 
5 pre-arrest pre-Miranda warning silence could be 
* 6 used to impeach a defendant's exculpatory testimony 
7 at trial. But it did not, the Court in going 
8 through the Palmer case says that it cannot be used 
9 as in, in the case in chief. 
10 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 MR. GRAVIS: So we're dealing with a 
12 situation here where like Palmer, this is even 
13 closer to the facts of Palmer because Palmer was 
14 not in custody. The officers weren't sent there, 
15 he was not in the process of being arrested. In 
16 Palmer he was talking to the detective on the 
17 telephone. 
18 THE JUDGE: Well so that I am clear, 
19 what you're saying in applying Palmer is, if I 
20 understand it, that the statement of the defendant 
21 when the officers found him out hiding in the 
22 bushes should not have been admitted? 
23 MR, GRAVIS: No. The statement of the 
24 defendant should have been admitted. He, he 
25 said-- But what they're saying is what he didn't 
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say is also evidence which is similar to the Palm 
case. In Palmer he had talked--
THE JUDGE: Well I guess I need to ask 
you at what point is what he didn't say being 
considered? At what point of this whole 
scenario? 
MR, GRAVIS: In the City's argument, in 
their response they're arguing that because he di 
not state that it was, he was acting in 
self-defense--
THE JUDGE: Oh, you know. In other 
words, he didn't raise the question that he was 
kicked in the groin--
Yes . 
-- in the first instance. 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE JUDGE: 
All right 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. GRAVIS: 
That's correct. 
Okay. 
And they're saying that 
therefore that's evidence that that happened 
because he didn't say anything about it. And it 
our position that is not evidence that it didn't 
happen. It is clearly something that could be 
brought up why he didn't say anything about it a 
the point of being cross examined. 
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1 ' It would have been a different story if he 
2 had, if he had been, been Mirandized and questioned 
3 and waived his Miranda rights and not said anything 
4 about it. At that point then he has to tell 
5 everything that happened. Because with the officer 
* 6 questioning him had he had been silent about it 
7 then there could have been an admission by silence 
8 at that point. 
9 But he was not questioned, he was not 
10 Mirandized. And therefore, it's not an admission 
11 by silence since there was no even questioning as 
12 to what happened other than his statement to where 
13 he admitted that he struck the victim and admitted 
14 to remorse. But he was not questioned about the 
15 incident as to what led up to him striking the 
16 victim. And it's not, it's not incompatible with 
17 innocence that he admitted that he struck the 
18 victim, because he did, and that he had remorse 
19 about doing it, because he did feel sorry about 
20 II it. But it doesn't mean that he did not strike in 
21 || self-defense. I mean, people who act in 
22 II self-defense can certainly have remorse for what 
23 || they did and feel bad about what they did and still 
24 || be acting in self-defense. 
25 || So it's clearly our position that there's 
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1 no corroboration of the City as to the prior 
2 statement of Patricia Kling. 
3 The City also tries to argue well, they 
4 never noticed anything unusual about his walk or 
5 anything like that. That does not mean that he 
6 was not kicked or, in the groin area just because 
7 he may not have been kicked directly in the 
8 testicles and to the point that he was 
9 incapacitated. Clearly he'd been able to leave the 
10 house at some point. As to, and there is no 
11 evidence as to the degree of or exactly where he 
12 was struck as to whether he would be walking funny 
13 or anything like that. So a kick in the groin 
14 area does not necessarily mean a kick in the 
15 testicles that would result in him being somewhat 
16 incapacitated. 
17 So it is our position that the evidence 
18 presented by the City was insufficient to sustain 
19 the conviction since Mrs. Kling clearly repudiated 
20 her prior statement in that she stated under oath 
21 that, that the statement she gave was not accurate 
22 in that she, the officers and the, the medical 
23 personnel (inaudible phrase, no mic) very much 
24 brushed her aside when she tried to tell them about 
25 the, her assault on the defendant prior to him 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER 
PAGE 143 
1 acting in self-defense and that, so she repudiated 
2 that prior statement. And under the Ramsey case 
3 there's insufficient evidence to sustain the 
4 conviction in this case. Thank you. 
5 THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you, 
6 Mr. Gravis. 
7 Mr. Garside? 
8 PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION 
9 (NOT USING SYSTEM MICROPHONE) . . 
10 MR. GARSIDE: First of all, with regard 
11 to the, the silence Mr. Gravis was referring to. 
12 Again, I think that that's, that's more than, than 
13 corroborative evidence that was presented by the, 
14 by the City as far as the officers noting no 
15 comment either by, by Ms. Kling or by the defendant 
16 and then noticing no injuries to the defendant. 
17 Now, my recollection of the evidence was 
18 that, that when Ms. Kling testified that she, that 
19 she did kick the defendant her exact words were 
20 that she got him good. So whether she observed 
21 some type of reaction at that time, it was claimed 
22 that there was some type of reaction. Clearly 
23 there were no, there were no lasting, no lasting 
24 ailments from, from that striking. 
25 But I think that the important thing here 
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1 is, is I think what the, what the defense has been 
2 trying to do the whole time is, is try to look at 
3 some isolated pieces of this whole evening. I 
4 would submit to the Court that I think the more 
5 appropriate thing to do is look at the entire 
6 evening. How was it that the dispute started? 
7 Who was the aggressor in the dispute? Who, who is 
8 it that would have actually been using 
9 self-defense? 
10 It's uncontroverted that while they were, 
11 they were at a club or a bar drinking that the 
12 defendant got into a disagreement with some other 
13 people. Ms. Kling testified that, that she 
14 somewhat intervened and said, you know Mr. Wolfe, 
15 guess what, you're wrong. And so he was angry with 
16 her for that. Then when it came time for them to 
17 leave she again refused to let him drive because of 
18 the amount of alcohol that he had consumed. He 
19 had again became angry. She said that on the way 
20 home, my recollection of the evidence is on the way 
21 home that he was berating her again. 
22 Then when we get home again it's not 
23 controverted that all she wanted to do was just to 
24 go to bed, go to sleep, end the day. And he 
25 wouldn't let her. He was pushing her, he was 
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1 shoving her, he would not leave her alone. While 
2 he's still doing this pushing and shoving that's 
3 when she acknowledges that she slaps him. 
4 And then her written statement and her 
5 statement to the police and to the officer then 
6 follows that same line. She slapped him and in 
7 response to her slapping him is when he hits her in 
8 the face with a closed fist and her, and then she 
9 gets the bloody nose. 
10 Now, I would submit to the Court that, 
11 that that is consistent as opposed to, as opposed 
12 to somehow Ms. Kling now becoming the aggressor and 
13 she now knees the defendant in the groin and he 
14 punches her to stop her from doing it a second 
15 time. 
16 I submit to the Court now I think the 
17 evidence was also clear that this was Ms. Kling's 
18 home, that Mr. Wolfe's name is nowhere on it. This 
19 was occurring within her home. The fact that she 
20 II was trying to stop his pushing and shoving, like I 
21 || said, all she wanted to do was, was to go to sleep. 
22 || I think it's interesting to note that both 
23 || the Ramsey case and the Webb case that are cited 
24 || by, by the defense counsel are cases involving 
25 || sexual abuse of some young children and it was 
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1 || their out-of-court statements without any 
2 || corroboration that occurred in court is why those 
3 || convictions were overturned. 
4 II Here we did have that corroboration. The 
5 fact that the interview with the police and the 
6 interview with the, with the emergency room 
7 physician was separated in time, different 
8 individuals involved, but the results are the 
9 same. And now Ms. Kling's saying that they didn't 
10 want to hear the fact that she had struck the 
11 defendant I would submit to the Court is, is a 
12 curiosity. 
13 Another curiosity that is pointed out in 
14 the memorandum is, is how her testimony is further 
15 reflected in the fact that at the time-- That was 
16 a written statement. At the time that she spoke to 
17 the doctor it was a closed fist to the nose, by the 
18 defendant to her nose. In her testimony at the 
19 day of trial then it became nothing more than a 
20 II slap that happened to catch her nose. Significant 
21 || differences. 
22 || Now the case cited by, by the Court in its 
23 || decision as well as the defense counsel is the 
24 || State versus Nowell (?) as far as the utilization 
25 || of self-defense. I think that the facts in that 
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1 case are interesting. It's basically what that is, 
2 it's a couple of transients both looking for work 
3 and they, they ended up buddying up in, in Salt 
4 Lake. And they were drinking and pretty soon they 
5 got into a fight. Well the person who ended up 
6 being a victim was able to take a knife away from 
7 the individual who ended up being the defendant 
8 while they're having this fight. And the victim 
9 actually stabbed the defendant a couple .of times. 
10 Well, while the wrestling continued the defendant 
11 then was able to get the knife back from the, from 
12 the person who ended up being the victim and then 
13 began stabbing the victim who eventually died from 
14 multiple stab wounds. The Court said once the 
15 defendant had regained the knife basically the 
16 fight was over, his license of self-defense was 
17 gone. 
18 Well, I would submit to the Court that, 
1 9 II that here we, if, even taking the case as, as 
20 || defense counsel presents it, any license that 
21 || Mr. Wolfe had to exercise self-defense was gone. 
22 || And the fact that, that she was trying to repel his 
23 || attacks and he ends up being the aggressor in her 
24 || home I would submit to the Court falls in line with 
25 || those facts and Mr. Wolfe did not have the license 
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1 to use self-defense in this case. 
2 And again, as far as us proving the 
3 absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
4 1 think that the case of Nowell (?) states that 
5 this is no different than someone using an alibi 
6 witness. This is just something that the finder 
7 of fact has to weigh. And I believe in the 
8 Court's findings in, in this matter did weigh, the 
9 weight, did give, the weight and credibility to the 
10 various witnesses and, and reflected the fact that 
11 defendant's testimony was somewhat self-serving. 
12 As well as Ms. Kling's now. It changed over a 
13 period of time now that they've reconciled and are 
14 still living together. 
15 I would submit to the Court that, that the 
16 evidence clearly supports a conviction and that the 
17 conviction stands. Thank you. 
18 THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
19 Mr. Gravis? 
2 0 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY MR. GRAVIS FOR DEFENSE 
21 (STANDING AWAY FROM SYSTEM MIC) 
22 MR. GRAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. Briefly 
23 as the Nowell (sp?) case states it is the City's 
24 duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
25 self-defense did not exist. Now, this is a case--
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1 Mr. Garside wants to point out that this 
2 is Mrs. Kling's home. Yes, she is the owner. But 
3 Mr. Wolfe had been living there for a long period 
4 of time too so it's his residence also. Further, 
5 this is a situation where after she had slapped him 
6 and kicked him she was, she testified she was 
7 attempting to do it again at the time that he hit 
8 her. So I would submit that this is not, this is 
9 not a situation where the fight was over, that he 
0 got the knife or anything else. This was a, she 
11 was attempting to strike him. And there's another 
12 time when she testified that she was trying to kick 
13 him again when he hit her. 
14 I THE JUDGE: Well Mr. Garside argues that, 
15 and my recollection of the facts is that they got 
16 home and she went in the bedroom, she was trying to 
17 get to sleep when he was pushing her and shoving 
18 her and trying to fulminate some kind of a 
19 confrontation or argument when she slapped him. 
20 Couldn't he just back away then and stop 
21 pushing her and shoving her? 
22 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I remember that 
23 you went into the testimony. And it's been a while 
! 
24 since the trial. But, but the shoving and pushing 
25 was mutual also. And yes, he could have backed 
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1 away and she could have backed away but the law of 
2 self-defense does not require you to retreat. 
3 THE JUDGE: Well self-defense from what? 
4 1 mean if she's, if you're pushing somebody and 
5 they turn around and retaliate by slapping you 
6 then, then why can't you just back away? 
7 This isn't a case, is it, where she's the 
8 aggressor coming after him? 
9 MR. GRAVIS: I think that the testimony 
10 was they were arguing. And like I say, my memory 
11 is somewhat faded with the time since the trial. 
12 But my memory is that the testimony was that she 
13 was involved in the pushing. This was a situation 
14 where, where she had started the pushing and 
15 started the, then the further aggression. 
16 THE JUDGE: All right. Please go 
17 ahead. 
18 MR. GRAVIS: But as I stated this, this 
19 is not a situation where, as Mr. Garside would like 
20 the Court to believe, that there's a defense of 
21 habitation on her part because this is, they're 
22 both in their habitat. Though she may be the 
23 legal owner he had, he had been a resident there 
24 for quite sometime. They'd been living together 
25 for quite sometime and maintain that relationship 
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1 now. 
2 Furthermore as I stated, this is not a 
3 case where there was a weapon involved and he got 
4 the knife back. She was trying to kick him again 
5 when he hit her. I'd submit that that is a 
6 situation where it's a, that's where it 
7 differentiates from the Nowell (?) case. But more 
8 importantly as I stated, the self-defense does not 
9 require the, the actor to retreat. 
10 So we would submit that there is 
11 insufficient evidence for the conviction. 
12 THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. In 
13 her statement to the police she stated that she was 
14 just trying to go to bed and he kept after her, he 
15 was shoving her and pushing her, pushed her down on 
16 the bed. She got angry and slapped him and he 
17 just kept shoving her. 
18 MR. GRAVIS:. Well the statement, what our 
19 argument is, is that the statement is not 
20 II admissible. It cannot be the basis of the 
21 || conviction where she's repudiated that statement. 
22 || That's our position that her, her testimony in 
23 II trial repudiates that statement. It's our position 
24 || under Ramsey that, that the Court cannot--
25 || THE JUDGE: Yes. But the cases, 
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1 || Mr. Gravis, the cases you cite use the words solely 
2 || on the basis of an out-of-court, unsworn statement 
3 || and, and entirely and standing alone and things of 
4 II that kind. That's what the statements are in the 
5 cases you cite to the Court. That simply doesn't 
6 fit these facts. 
7 MR. GRAVIS: I would submit it does fit 
8 the facts. There's actually no-- There are two 
9 people that were there when it happened--
10 THE JUDGE: But what, what do you, what 
11 do you say about doctor, or Officer Hill's 
12 testimony? 
13 MR. GRAVIS: Officer Hill wasn't there 
14 when it happened. He--
15 THE JUDGE: Well, he doesn't have to be 
16 there when it happened. 
17 MR. GRAVIS: But he didn't-- All he's 
18 relying on here are the statements of the 
19 defendant--
2 0 THE JUDGE: Yes. 
21 MR. GRAVIS: -- and the statements of 
22 Ms. Kling. 
23 THE JUDGE: Well now, now then isn't the 
24 statement of the defendant additional to what you 
25 say are solely the repudiated testimony of 
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1 Mrs. Kling? 
2 MR. GRAVIS: But to, to show that 
3 self-defense does not exist based upon his 
4 statement you'd have to rely on his silence as, as 
5 evidence instead of impeachment. 
6 THE JUDGE: Well, let's go to that for 
7 just a minute. What are you saying? That, that 
8 if an officer asks you a question about something 
9 and you respond with a statement like yes, I hit 
10 her. The fact that you don't then also go ahead 
11 and say but she kicked me in the groin first, that 
12 then that silence, the one is admissible but the 
13 other isn't? 
14 MR. GRAVIS: Well, the officer in this 
15 case didn't question the defendant. He made, made 
16 the statement that he was never Mirandized, never 
17 questioned. 
18 THE JUDGE: All right. But you, you 
19 acknowledged earlier his statement comes in. 
20 II MR. GRAVIS: His statement comes in. 
21 || THE JUDGE: Why doesn't the absence at 
22 || that very moment of a claim that she kicked me in 
23 || the groin, why doesn't that come in? 
24 || MR, GRAVIS: Because it's the same, same 
25 || situation as Palmer. 
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1 || THE JUDGE: Well, if the one is a 
2 || pre-Miranda statement and admissible, why isn't the 
3 II other? 
4 MR. GRAVIS: The silence isn't because 
5 you're asking a Court or a finder of fact to 
6 speculate what the silence may mean. 
7 THE JUDGE: Well, wouldn't the, wouldn't 
8 the affirmative statement be more damaging than the 
9 silence? If they're both pre-Miranda and the one 
10 is inadmissible, I can't see why the other wouldn't 
11 be. 
12 MR. GRAVIS: Well it's pre-- Because 
13 silence can mean anything. It, it is admissible 
14 for impeachment purposes. That's what the courts 
15 have held. When the witness, when the defendant 
16 takes the stand and he's been silent about 
17 something, you can question him about his silence. 
18 But to argue that it's substantive evidence I would 
19 submit, particularly where it's not, it's not a 
20 || situation where he's being silent after being 
21 H asked a question where you can say it's an 
22 || admission by silence where when some, you would 
23 || expect somebody to respond to the question and by 
24 || not responding there's somehow an admission by 
25 || silence as recognized by the Rules of Evidence, 
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1 there are admissions by silence. 
2 But this is not a situation where the 
3 officer is questioning him and he's waived, waived 
4 his Miranda rights, that he's being questioned and 
5 when they get to the question about what started 
* 6 this fight, who started it, that he remained 
7 silent, not invoking his 5th Amendment right but 
8 simply remained silent and therefore you can infer 
9 that the silence is an admission. 
10 In this case he was not questioned about 
11 it so you're, you're speculating as to why he 
12 didn't mention it. It may be an inference of 
13 guilt, it may be some other inferences. His 
14 testimony was he was intoxicated and he was sorry 
15 and remorseful. He admitted that he hit her which 
16 is not inconsistent with acting in self-defense. 
17 THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
18 The Court hasn't read the Palmer case and 
19 I, of course, will take a look at it. But based on 
20 the way it's been characterized for the Court, the 
21 Court doesn't believe that the silence of 
22 defendant, that is the absence of a claim by 
23 defendant to having been assaulted by Ms. Kling, 
24 was not admissible. The Court believes that if he 
25 makes one statement, his failure to make another 
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1 statement at the same time should be considered. 
2 If the one is admissible certainly the other is 
3 in the Court's view. 
4 The Court denies the Motion in Arrest of 
5 Judgment. And Court's prepared to go. ahead with 
6 sentencing now and if you'd like to address that, 
7 Mr. Gravis, the Court would be glad to hear that. 
8 MR. GRAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. I did have 
9 an opportunity to have the Court provide me with my 
10 copy of the presentence report, to review it and go 
11 over it briefly with Mr. Wolfe and have gone over 
12 the recommendation. And would ask the Court to 
13 follow the recommendation. 
14 THE JUDGE: All right. Then, 
15 Mr. Garside, the prosecution is welcome to make 
16 input towards sentencing but not required to. Is 
17 there anything you want to say about that? 
18 MR, GARSIDE: I have not had an 
19 opportunity to review the presentence report so I 
20 II don't know what it is that, that they, that they 
21 || are proposing. But generally it's been our 
22 || position to leave it to the Court's discretion. 
23 || In this matter the Court was the, .was the finder of 
24 || fact as well and I don't know that any additional 
25 || information could be that much help, at least from 
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